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THE ROOTS OF COOPERATIVE CREDIT FROM A THEORETICAL AND 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 






Credit is indubitably one of the most important sectors in which the supply of goods 
and  services  by  cooperatives  has  arisen.  Given  the  importance  of  the  role  of 
cooperative  banks  in  the  development  of  other  sectors  and  of  the  territories  or 
communities in which they operate, and the economic and political power that they 
consequently  confer  on  those  who  manage  them,  some  of  the  inherent  problems 
distinctive in general of not-for-profit organizations become critical. In particular: in 
the  case  of  rapid  growth  beyond  the  original  group  and  area,  the  possibility  of 
maintaining the principles of reciprocity and participation; the role and motivations of 
the social entrepreneurs acting in the bank; the corporate social responsibility, which, 
in  the  case  of  a  bank,  is  closely  connected  to  how  the  community’s  savings  are 
employed and how investments are selected. As with other cooperative enterprises, 
credit can be supplied in a variety of forms with different purposes and with different 
positive  and/or  negative  externalities.  Evaluation  of  the  respective  advantages  and 
disadvantages  must  bear  in  mind  the  different  contexts  in  which  individual  banks 
operate, considering both theoretical aspects (potentialities) and historical ones (past 
and present modes of operation). These inherent problems are discussed in the first 
part of the work from a theoretical point of view; while in the second part the first 
applications  and  the  debate  that  accompanied  them  are  analysed,  given  their 
importance in determining the features of subsequent experiences. In particular, we 
shall  show  that  they  stem  from  two  different  interpretations  of  solidarity  and 
reciprocity: the first one, theorized and, to a certain extent, realized in the Raiffeisen 
model, is mainly ethical in nature; the second one, typical of the Schulze Delitzsch 
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1. Socially responsible production and cooperative credit 
 
I would as soon trust a man whose interest binds him 
to be just to me, as a man whose principle binds himself 
D. Defoe, Captain Singleton 
 
Never before has one been subjected 
to so many ideas distant from common sense,  
nor for that matter ones better argued, more controlled…  
P. Valéry, L’Idée Fixe 
 
1.1.  Individual interest and extended interest 
 
The  recent  economic  crisis  has  reinvigorated  the  debate  on  the  potential  conflict 
between  the  maximization  of  personal  interest  and  public  well-being,  and  on  the 
relationship  that  should  exist  between  private  initiative  and  regulation.  More 
specifically,  the  financial  origins  of  the  crisis,  at  least  in  its  more  contingent  and 
immediate  dimension,  and  the  responsibility  or  connivance  of  banks  in  its  regard, 
have again raised the issue of the extent to which the system of controls should be 
expanded to prevent the most deleterious effects of the maximization of profit in a 
sector so vulnerable and prone to degeneration – in the sense of social irresponsibility 
– but also vital for the economy
2. Of course, the current crisis has dimensions that lie 
deeper and are therefore less immediately perceivable (for instance, those of the real 




Strong doubts on the reliability of private self -interested action in promoting the 
interests  of  the  collectivity  (the  polis,  Christian  community  or  nation-state)  were 
already present in Greek thought, in that of the scholastics, the mercantilists, and the 
physiocrats.
4 These schools differed in their conceptions of collective well-being (social 
stability in Plato and Aristotle, Christian justice in Thomas Aquinas, development and 
state power through the accumulation of precious metals for Colbert, or through the 
growth of net product for Quesnay and Mirab eau). But they were identical in their 
distrust  of  unfettered  private  interest  and  their  identification  of  the  solution  in 
extensive regulation of economic activity.
5 
 
It was only with Adam Smith that self -interested behaviour found legitimacy in an 
analytical scheme, although this was significantly distorted by the classical economists 
of  the  early  1800s.  Smith,  in  fact,  did  not  rest  economic  salvation  on  a  single 
                                                 
2 On the dissonance between the bad reputation of financial activity and its very positive social role, see Sen, 
1991. 
3 The principal characteristics of market fundamentalism are the following: financialization of the economy, the 
deregulation of markets, the liberalization of  international capital movements and the consequent stimulus to 
financial speculation, delocalization of production, the privatization also of goods and services which by their 
nature are unsuited to supply by the market, the consideration of nature as a mere production factor, the 
progressive marketing of science, the subordination of politics/policies to the economy, the claim that the only 
way to manage the economy and society is on liberalist principles (Burlando 2009). 
4 On this see Medema 2009.  
5 A position shared, despite a certain common opinion, also by the physiocrats: their appeal for the slackening of 
restrictions (the well-known “laissez faire, laissez passer”) concerned only agricultural production, deemed the 
sole source of net product, and it was flanked by demands for state measures in favour of agriculture in place of 
mercantilist policies.  
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motivation, and he did not “assign a generally superior role to  the pursuit of self- 
interest  in  any  of  his  writings.  The  defence  of  self-interested  behaviour  comes  in 
specific  contexts,  particularly  related  to  various  contemporary  bureaucratic  barriers 
and  other  restrictions  to  economic  transactions  which  made  trade  difficult  and 
hampered production” (Sen 1987: 25). It was the classical economists who supposed 
that individual interest,
6 regulated on an explicit and direct costs/benefits calculation, 
was the fundamental, if not the unique, incentive for economic action, leaving only the 
market self-regulated by competition with the task of channelling these forces driven 
by non-altruistic impulses towards greater social well-being. By doing so, the classical 
economists  not  only  misinterpreted  Smith’s  complex  position  on  markets  and  the 
motivations  of  economic  action
7,  but  they  also  neglected  his  ethical  analysis  of 
sentiments and behaviour. It is precisely this “narrowing of the broad Smithian view 
of  human  beings,  in  modern  economies,  that  can  be  seen  as  one  of  the  major 
deficiencies of contemporary economic theory” (Sen 1987: 28). 
 
The classical paradigm was disputed from the mid-1800s onwards,  until in the first 
half  the  1900s  an  alternative  paradigm  emerged    that  was  sceptical  of  the  self-
regulatory capacity of markets  and confident in the normative role of the state. The 
main  cause  of  the  market’s  failure  to  maximize  social  well-being
8  was identified  – 
besides  in  imperfect  competition
9  and  the  inevitable  formation  of  more  or  less 
monopolistic positions – in its twofold inability (i) to induce individuals to consider the 
creation of positive and negative externalities in their costs/benefits calculations; (ii) 
to  encourage  individuals  to  produce  public  or  collective  goods,  given  their 
characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption.
10 It was therefore 
the state’s task to improve social well-being on the one hand by  forcing economic 
agents, through its normative and coercive apparatus,
11 to consider social costs and 
benefits as well, and on the other, by supplying the necessary pub lic goods. In its 
                                                 
6 Contrary to Sen (1987), who tends to equate selfishness with self-interest, Medema (2009:1) argues that self-
interest should not be confused with mere selfishness and that economists would never have assumed that 
people think only about themselves or that they are greedy. “What they have consistently assumed is that people 
will do the things that they believe will make them the happiest, given the various circumstances of their lives, 
and that businessmen will pursue profits. Yes, there are variations on this assumption – from the notion that 
people behave ‘as if’ they were pursuing their self-interest, to the idea that people ‘tend to’ pursue their self-
interest, to the very strong assumption that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions who function as 
lightning calculators of benefits and costs. The common denominator, though, is that self-interest is a motivating 
force in individual behaviour”. 
7 Alfred Marshall was aware of this misinterpretation, to the point of suggesting that “Adam Smith’s doctrine, 
carefully interpreted supports [government’s] active intervention in many affairs in an age in which it has 
acquired the power and the will to govern the people wisely, and the people have acquired the power and the 
will to govern their Government with knowledge, discretion and restraint” (Marshall, 1923: 719; see Medema, 
2009: 58). 
8 The market’s failure does not necessarily mean that it does not exist, as in the case of the non-supply of public 
goods, but rather that the market is inefficient, in that prices differ from marginal costs, with the consequence 
that the market does not maximize social well-being. 
9 Only subsequently was imperfect information more expressly considered. 
10 The two aspects partly overlap, in that positive externalities often consist of public goods. In fact, “a collective 
good for some groups is nothing more than some aspect of the state of the world that all members of the group 
wish to see brought about” (Schofield 1985: 207). According to the level of  possible exclusion (nil or partial), we 
have pure or impure public goods, and the most efficient consumption unit may be a very large group or a small 
one (the optimal size will depend on the equilibrium between the possibility of reducing the supply costs at the 
margin and the increasing marginal cost of congestion). 
11 The state does not obtain respect for its institutions (norms) only through the use of coercion: to reduce the 
costs of enforcement, it fosters their internalization through a process of ideologization. Still valid, however, is 
the ultimate recourse to the coercive monopoly which distinguishes the state from any other legal organization.  
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turn, this paradigm was contested in the second half of the 1900s
12 on the basis of 
two arguments: first, that the state’s choices and management was also a matter of 
individual  interest  for  voters,  politicians  and  bureaucrats,  which  gave  rise  to  state 
failures  in  the  maximization  of  social  well-being;  the  second,  that  the  market  can 
remedy its failures with appropriate legislation. 
 
This oscillation between the two paradigms is indicative of a certain degree of not only 
indeterminacy but also incompleteness in the analytical framework of the dominant 
economic  theories,  and  in  the  policy  directions  that  refer  to  them.  The  opposition 
between market monetary incentives and public coercion, in fact, implies that there is 
a unique pattern of human action based on self-interest and on the greater or lesser 
need to control it and integrate it with state intervention. Only recently has analysis 
begun  of  this  incompleteness.  It  has  been  conducted  by  various  currents  of 
sociological  thought;  by  the  new  theories  that  view  the  firm  as  a  coordination 
mechanism intended to solve collective problems through the production of goods and 
services; by the behaviourist school and by experimental economics, which show that 
economic behaviour is also influenced by a general propensity for reciprocity and the 
quest for justice and equity
13. Nevertheless, despite all the criticisms and the fact that 
empirical evidence for the universality of the principle of self -interested behaviour is 
scant or non-existent – the success of a free market “does not tell us anything at all 
about what motivation lies behind the action of economic agents in such an economy” 
(Sen 1987: 18) – this assumption is still the basis of the dominant economic theory 
and the theory taught. 
 
Put in more detail, but mainly considering the supply side, reducing the motivations 
for economic behaviour to individual interest and government coercion is to neglect 
the following aspects: 
1.  Individuals are simultaneously members of several communities or groups  of 
different level and extent,
14 which intermediate between one individual and the 
others and influence decisions to an often significant extent. “Actions based on 
group  loyalty  may  involve,  in  some  respects,  a  sacrifice  of  purely  personal 
interests,  just  as  they  can  also  facilitate,  in  other  respects,  the  greater 
fulfilment of personal interests” (Sen 1987: 20). 
2.  The  environmental  conditionings  transmitted  through  acculturation  processes 
inspire both ethical considerations based on the sense of justice, solidarity and 
reciprocity,  and  desire  for  acceptance,  as  well  as  customary  and  gregarious 
behaviours.
15 Reciprocity is promoted by trust in similar behaviour by others, 
which may generate a moral obligation of reciprocation, that is, a normative 
value with interiorization of the norm.
16 Indeed, interiorization of the norm may 
induce instinctive compliance with it, even without specific justification and 
rationalization, thereby strengthening a tendency to conform (see Boccaccio 
2007). 
                                                 
12 Contestation led by the economists of the Chicago and Virginia schools. 
13 On the limits of the mainstream economic approach to understand in general the pluralism of  the motivations 
to economic action and to explain in particular the role of cooperative and social enterprise, see Borzaga, 
Depedri e Tortia, 2010. 
14 “individuality exists, but only internally to ... social contexts” (Etzioni 1988: xi). 
15 Imitative behaviour consists in observing and then imitating, with a temporal sequence, other people’s 
behaviour, frequently that of leaders. 
16 The normative notion of reciprocity extends the restricted one first analysed by Axelrod, 1984,  whereby, 
under certain conditions, individuals who pursue their interest can learn to collaborate, particularly when they 
adopt “tit for tat” strategies.  See also Axelrod 1997.  
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3.  Social  contexts  express  not  only  shared  values  but  also  power  structures 
reflected in exchange relationships: individuals and organizations thus deploy 
both economic and political power to pursue their economic interests. 
4.  Since  needs  also  have  a  moral,  environmental  and  expressive  nature,  they 
cannot  be  ordered  and  regulated  by  prices  alone.  This  has  profound 
consequences on objectives, evaluation criteria, and the choice of the means to 
achieve objectives. 
5.  The  supply  of  private  goods  and  services  is  not  the  prerogative  of  for-profit 
enterprises  or  the  state  alone,  but  also  of  households  and  not-for-profit 
enterprises, which respond to different incentives. In particular, it is not only 
for-profit  enterprises  that  operate  and  compete  on  the  market,  so  do  a 
heterogeneous  array  of  enterprises  that  differ  in  their  objectives,  ownership 
arrangements, and forms of governance. 
6.  Every  economic  organization  operates  on  the  basis  of  internal  cooperation 
which, also in the case of for-profit enterprises, is not induced by self-interest 
alone. Hence the relationships among agents within an enterprise are not only 
and necessarily competitive. Moreover, individuals also gain satisfaction from 
direct and personal participation in the management of production, as well as 
from opportunities to express their creativity. 
7.  The deliberate supply of public goods is the prerogative of not only the state 
but  also  of not-for-profit  organizations  (households,  enterprises,  foundations, 
etc.), as well as of for-profit enterprises, which therefore establish cooperative 
relations with the outside. The collective interest is therefore defined and also 
pursued by private agents autonomously (subsidiarity principle) and not only 
through delegation to the state. There consequently arises a corporate social 
responsibility  attentive  to  social  and  environmental  sustainability  besides  the 
economic  kind  that  varies  according  to  the  type  of  enterprise  and  from  one 
enterprise to another. 
 
As Hollis maintains (1998), it is therefore possible to complete the paradigm based on 
the  hypothesis  of  rational  self-interested  behaviour  aimed  at  the  maximization  of 
utility with the hypothesis of reciprocating behaviour. The utilitarian calculation that 
drives  the  decisions  of  individuals,  and  accordingly  those  of  organizations,  is 
influenced not only by limited knowledge and bounded rationality but also by ties with 
several communities, by considerations of reciprocity that may have moral, customary 
and  emotional  roots,  and  considerations  concerning  power  or  expressing  the 
personality.
17 The interest that guides the costs/benefits calculation is therefore an 
extended (or mediated, indirect)
18 interest produced by the integration of immediate 
individual interest with the assumption of social responsibility, this being understood 
as awareness of, and concern for, the externalities created by one’s action and the 
desire to contribute to the supply of collective goods.
19 Therefore, personal interest 
may fluctuate from the exclusive concern for own utility to the concern for other 
people’s welfare (see Ben-Ner, Montias and Neuberger 1993: 210). The greater the 
social responsibilization, the more externalities are spontaneously considered – with 
the  internalization of  negative  ones  and  the  production of positive  ones  –  and  the 
greater  becomes  the  private  supply  of  collective  goods.  In  this  way,  benefits  are 
                                                 
17 Hence, besides homo oeconomicus, there is also a homo sociologicus, a homo ethicus and a homo faber. 
Happiness therefore does not coincide with hedonistic pleasure but also comprises sociability and  appreciation 
by others. As Sen emphasises (1987: 15), reducing rationality from the internal coherence of choices wholly to 
the maximization of self-interest, excluding anything else, is to reject any ethical motivation of decisions. 
18 In Cooter’s (1994) terminology, “thick self-interest” as opposed to “thin self-interest”. 
19 “The mixture of selfish and selfless behaviour is one of the important characteristics of group loyalty” (Sen, 
1987: 20).  
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transmitted  to  the  members  of  society,  in  that  individuals  voluntarily  abide  with  a 
given type of behaviour which may (though not necessarily) be ratified in a contract 
or encoded in a custom. There are two significant differences with respect to state 
regulation of individual behaviour and the coerced acceptance of norms: first, there is 
greater  efficiency  and  equity,  because  bureaucratic  costs  and  compensation  for 
damages, not always entirely transferable to the persons responsible, are avoided; 
second, change is made to the “social preference function”, that is, the composition of 
the  supply  of  goods  and  services  and  the  distribution  of  income  desired  by  the 
collectivity. 
 
It should be pointed out, however, that extended interest and social responsibilization 
do not necessarily have the same configuration for all individuals. This will depend on 
three factors: the individual propensity to collaborate or defect;
20 what are the groups 
towards which the individual feels interest and responsibilization (the family, the firm, 
an association, a given territory/community, the state, the whole world, etc.); and 
how s/he reconciles possible contradictions among these multiple responsibilizations
21. 
Depending on how individuals feel and reconcile their affiliations and loyalties, and 
according  to  how  groups  apply  systems  of  incentives  and  sanctions,
22  different 
aggregate  outcomes  ensue,  often  territorially  connoted  according  to  the  cultural 
heritage and its conditioni ngs. In other words, there will arise different levels and 
forms of cooperation, different levels of efficiency and social well-being, and therefore 
different  needs  for  intervention  by  the  state  as  the  ultimate  regulator.  The  mix 
between maximizing behaviour and reciprocating behaviour (both cooperative and 
defecting) may therefore give rise to a multiplicity of equilibria, thus once again 
contradicting the orthodox hypothesis – never verified empirically – of the uniqueness 
of the equilibrium. 
 
1.2. Not-for-profit production 
 
The  production  of  private  goods  and  services  comes  about  through  organizations 
(households,  for-profit  firms,  not-for-profit  enterprises,  the  state)  which  differ  in 
various respects: in their goals, internal forms of cooperation and the motivations for 
it,  responses  to  incentives  and  disincentives,  and  therefore  in  the  creation  of 
externalities and public goods (in terms of both quantity and composition), production 
and  transaction  costs,  viability,  and  functioning.  These  organizations  sometimes 
operate in exclusive contexts, at other times in competition with each other. In this 
case, efficient choice among different solutions requires diversified regulation which 
puts these organizations on an equal footing, so that each can maximize its potential, 
without establishing legal regimes which favour some of them for ideological reasons. 
Otherwise, there arise risks of staticity, corporativism and allocative inefficiency. 
 
The  internal  cooperation  necessary  for  every  productive  organization  rests  on 
interpersonal relations (or relational goods), not necessarily market-based, which give 
rise  to  regulation  and  coordination  functions,  and  on  the  diffusion  of  knowledge. 
According  to  the  type  of  organization,  internal  cooperation  therefore  depends  to 
differing  extents  on  voluntary  non-coercive  mechanisms  based  on  an  extended 
conception  of  individual  interest.  The  property  of  not-for-profit  organizations  is 
                                                 
20 Individual preferences are not homogeneous: people have different tolerances of other people’s defections, 
also in their reaction times. 
21 On the role of social identity, the possibility of multiple alternative identities that may be in competition in a 
given context, and on the space that choice and reasoning may find in this role, see Sen, 1999. 
22 If the group is cooperative, i.e. complies with reciprocity rules, the signalling of it and the punishment of 
deviants is beneficial to it.  
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grounded  to  a  greater  extent  than  that  of  for-profit  organizations  on  interpersonal 
exchanges  regulated  by  contracts,  accords,  and  spatially  or  sectorally  localized 
community customs: cooperative behaviours, in fact, are significantly more numerous 
among the members of a community than among people who do not belong to the 
same  group  (Goette,  Huffman  and  Meier  2006).  The  widespread  interest  in  the 
production  and  enjoyment  of  externalities  and  the  possibility  to  exert  control  over 
other  people’s  behaviour  (so  that  it  is  not  opportunistic)  means  that  strategies  of 
behaviour  are  based  on  a  matrix  of    payoffs  modified  to  a  greater  extent  by  the 
enlargement of satisfaction than is the matrix deriving from the mere satisfaction of 
individual interest. These are organizations which seek to benefit both their members 
and the community: they do not maximize profit, they have distributive constraints, 
and ownership and control rights are often assigned to the stakeholders as well the 
shareholders. 
 
These enterprises, besides undertaking a role alternative to those of for-profit firms 
and  the  state,  may  also  perform  a  role  complementary  to  them.  Whilst  on  hasty 
inspection,  the  market  too  may  appear  composed,  and  to  a  remarkable  extent,  of 
personal relationships, more careful analysis reveals that these relationships concern 
externalities or public goods deriving from behaviours in principle extraneous to the 
market: reciprocity strengthens the market and compliance with  private contracts by 
restricting  the  opportunistic  behaviour  due  also  to  contractual  incompleteness.  By 
remedying  the  market’s  shortcomings  in  creating  trust,  responsibility,  and  social 
capital,  cooperative  enterprises  create  intangible  goods  as  well  as  economic  value. 
Not-for-profit  organizations  therefore  perform  a  twofold  function  in  regard  to  the 
market: substitutive, where only cooperative action makes the supply possible; and 
integrative,  because  such  organizations  improve  efficiency  in  the  use  of  resources, 
particularly  when  markets  are  characterized  by  imperfect  competition,  inadequate 
information, delays in adjustments, and high transaction costs. In this way, not-for-
profit organizations not only create public goods, on the basis of specific agreements 
or  contracts  to  coordinate  and  mobilize  resources  different  from  the  public  goods 
obtained through the normal acceptance of shared values;
23 they also select the public 
goods to be introduced into the economic system. They therefore go beyond a generic 
and  “spontaneous”  coordination  of  the  communities  to  an  outright  attitude.  With 
respect to norm-making by the state, where strategies of behaviour derive from a 
matrix of payments modified by sanctions, reciprocity strengthens the social contract 
by enhancing the sense of belonging. 
 
To use Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, we may say that cooperation is an extension 
of  “voice” from the political sphere to the economic one, and therefore of democracy 
to enterprise management. This facilitates the shared pursuit of the objective, which 
becomes the common good (that is, a good for which the advantage deriving to the 
individual is inseparable from that deriving to others).
24 It is nevertheless evident that 
the democracy of the cooperative enterprise may be jeopardized by growth in its size, 
in the extensiveness of its interests, and in its economic and political power  – all of 
which are elements that increase its heterogeneity. As Hansman (1996) has shown, 
cooperatives  prosper  the  more  their  members  have  homogeneous  preferences. 
Consequently, their difficulties grow the more the heterogeneity of their members and 
conflicts  of  interest  increase  –  all  the  more  so  if  the  decision-making  process  is 
                                                 
23 “In abiding by unenforced rules for behavior in social intercourse, individuals create ‘public good’” (Buchanan 
1975: 14). 
24 In the case of a common good the interest is realized together with that of others, while for a private good it is 
realized against the interests of others, and for a public good regardless of them (Zamagni 2006: 230).  
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appropriated by a particularly active, capable, and/or interested minority (of members 
and/or managers) which progressively ousts the less involved majority. 
 
It would therefore be unrealistic to analyse the behaviour of cooperative enterprises 
solely  on the  basis  of  the  principle  of extended reciprocity,  excluding  more  strictly 
self-interested considerations.  Cooperative enterprises may pursue both a common 
objective and individual benefits in a context of exchange. This applies especially to 
cooperative banks, for two reasons: the first is that they operate in an open market 
subject  to  competition,  at  least  potentially,
25  and cannot simply be considered the 
response to a specific failure of the capitalist form of e nterprise; the second is that, 
given the power that derives to cooperative banks from the control of often huge 
financial  resources,  they  probably  lend  themselves  more  readily  than  other 
cooperative enterprises to considerations of individual interest, bot h economic and 
more generally concerned with power – as we shall argue in the next section. 
 
1.3. The social entrepreneurial function
26  
 
How do not-for-profit supply organizations (in the form of enterprises or otherwise) 
arise  and  maintain  themselves,  given  that  they  cannot  rely  on  direct  individual 
interest and lack coercive force? In general, cooperative action involves an interaction 
that guarantees a sufficiently high level of reciprocity among the individuals making 
up a sufficiently large group interested in both the private good or service and in the 
public  ones  that  may  derive  from  it.  For  potential  to  be  exploited  efficiently,  it  is 
necessary to reach a critical mass that allows the formation of new equilibria.
27 Given 
that it is not possible to use coercion, a unanimous collective agreement constraining 
participation in the supply must be reached. This involves huge transaction costs 
which, if they cannot be abated, reduce the incentive to participate in the collective 
action, even among those most willing to contribute. 
 
If the good to be supplied is local  –  that  is,  concerns  a  relatively  small  group  – 
reaching the agreement and enforcing compliance will entail lower costs: the smaller 
the  group,  the  more  likely  become  repeated  games  where  continuous  voluntary 
relations among players favour knowledge and the predictability of others’ behaviour, 
as well as making reprisals possible.
28 Moreover, and partly as a result of this, the 
group  may  have  a  tradition  of  collective  action  –  a  collective  memory  –  which 
generates  positive  expectations  and  therefore  fosters  cooperation.  In  other  words, 
also as a result of small size, there may have been an accumulation of social capital 
whose  “re-investment”  favours  its  growth.  This  capital,  which  consists  of  shared 
reciprocity norms producing trust, solidarity networks, a spirit of collaboration, and a 
sense  of  community,  facilitates  the  pursuit  of  common  objectives  and  discourages 
forms  of  opportunistic  behaviour.  In  a  context  of  this  kind,  a  certain  number  of 
defections do not necessarily undermine group trust: rather, it is the overcoming of a 
certain threshold, not necessarily identical for all groups given the heterogeneity of 
tolerance, that determines the end of  trust and the onset of negative reciprocity, that 
is, widespread free-riding. These complex equilibria forebode significant problems if 
the supply expands beyond the original boundaries of the group. 
                                                 
25 Paradoxically, one could argue that, given the high level of collusion in the banking sector, cooperative banks 
are among the elements which give it greater competitiveness. 
26 This section draws on Goglio (1999). 
27 Understanding the process that may lead to attainment of critical mass requires analysis of phenomena such 
as tipping, feedback, path dependence and lock-in (see Schelling 1978). 
28 Knowledge about other people’s behaviour and its predictability are favoured more by voluntary interaction 
that by compliance with norms through state intervention (see Taylor 1982).  
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Although a local environment is characterized by lower transaction costs and easier 
control  over  opportunistic  behaviour,  it  does  not  necessarily  give  rise  to  the 
cooperative  supply  desired.  The  fact  that  the  action  that  must  lead  to  the  supply 
agreement is feasible in principle does not mean that it will assuredly be undertaken. 
As in the case of for-profit supply, there  must be a single or collective figure that 
assumes the task of appraising the likelihood of success and takes the initiative in 
starting the collective action by investing resources, energy, time, and reputation, and 
by assuming the connected risk of possible failure. The not-for-profit supply therefore 
depends on a social entrepreneurial function and on the willingness of the individuals 
concerned to cooperate with it. In other words, the entrepreneur must ensure that the 
investment gives rise to a set of shared norms that “creates, or evokes, a sense of 
obligation  in  the  players  concerning  the  strategies  that  they  follow”  (Cooter  1994: 
218). Whether or not this result is enshrined in a formal agreement, strengthened by 
reference to the state’s power of enforcement, is irrelevant from the theoretical point 
of view, because compliance with the action is a voluntary act performed to reinforce 
internalization  of  the  norm  –  that  is,  the  willingness  to  cooperate.  Because 
internalization  of  the  norm  modifies  the  payoff  matrix,  it  creates  tension  between 
immediate and  mediated  interests:  the  social  norm  rests  on  consensus  among  the 
members  of  the  group,  on  the  fact  that  cooperating  is  beneficial  and  that  non-
cooperation is harmful for that group, and therefore indirectly for single individuals. 
 
Why should  a social entrepreneur want to start up a not-for-profit supply, given the 
unlikeliness of direct economic profit? Firstly, providing a service and creating positive 
externalities  for  the  community  are  not  necessarily  distinct  from  the  pursuit  of  a 
broader  individual  interest.  The  entrepreneur  may  be  personally  interested  in  the 
availability of the good in question and be prepared to furnish greater effort, making 
his/her own skills available, to achieve this outcome. It may also be, however, that 
the social entrepreneur has no particular interest in the availability of the good: in this 
case, s/he may aim to gain him/herself particular credit in the community in order to 
reinforce a social position, political influence and power, or a certain ideology, Or else 
s/he  may  act  out  of  altruism.  This  latter  possibility,  however,  is  not  theoretically 
dissimilar  from  the  previous  one;  nor  is  it  always  easily  distinguishable  from  it  in 
reality,  given  the  close  interweaving  between  altruism  and  ideology  whereby  the 
former can yield an ideological benefit. 
 
Of particular  importance is the case of socially  influential or ambitious figures with 
political aims, or goals of power or career advancement, because they exacerbate the 
contradictions  and  risks  inherent  in  the  principal/agent  relationship.  As  politicians, 
public  administrators  and  officials  perform  their  supply  roles,  they  have  their  own 
interests as well, which may divert collective action from its initial goals and lead to 
less efficient solutions. The problem is potentially more serious if the role of social 
entrepreneur is undertaken by influential individuals without a direct interest in the 
availability  of  the  good,  because  activation  of  the  cooperative  supply  may  be  an 
intermediary goal towards final objectives not necessarily positive for the group. In 
general, the greater the direct interest of the social entrepreneur in the availability of 
the  good  in  question,  the  lower  the  likelihood  that  his/her  initiative  will  be 
instrumental to other ends. 
 
1.4. The cooperative supply of credit  
 
Credit is indubitably one of the most important sectors in which cooperative supply 
has arisen. Given the importance of the role of cooperative banks in the development  
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of other sectors, and of the territories or communities in which they operate, and the 
economic  and  political  power  that  they  consequently  confer  on  those  who  manage 
them,  some  of  the  inherent  problems  described  for  not-for-profit  organizations  in 
general in this case become crucial. In particular: 
1.  if  the  cooperative  bank  grows  and  extends  its  interests  beyond  the  original 
group and area, it may find it difficult to adhere to the principles of reciprocity 
and participation on which it was founded and then consolidated. Put otherwise, 
how far can extended interest be pushed without losing its operational force? 
2.  the  growth of the  cooperative  bank  and  social  and  economic  changes  in the 
community where it operates may have significant consequences on the role 
and  motivations of the social entrepreneurs acting in that bank; 
3.  in the case of a bank, corporate social responsibility is closely connected with 
how the community’s savings are employed and how investments are selected. 
The growth of a cooperative bank and changes in the role and motivations of 
entrepreneurs alter modes of management and objectives, and in so doing they 
may  have  important  repercussions  on  the  so-called  “social  responsibility  of 
savings”. 
 
As with other cooperative enterprises, credit as well can be supplied in a variety of 
forms,  with  different  purposes  and  with  different  positive  and/or  negative 
externalities.  Evaluation  of  advantages  and  disadvantages  must  bear  in  mind  the 
different  contexts  in  which  individual  banks  operate,  considering  both  theoretical 
aspects (potentialities) and historical ones (past and present modes of operation). To 
this end,  in what follows we shall analyse the first applications of the principles of 
solidarity and reciprocity in the financial field and the debate that accompanied them, 
given  their  importance  in  determining  the  features  of  subsequent  experiences.  In 
particular, we shall show that they drew on two different interpretations of solidarity 
and  reciprocity:  the  first  one,  theorized    and,  to  a  certain  extent,  realized  in  the 
Raiffeisen model is mainly ethical in nature; the second one,  typical of the Schulze 
Delitzsch model,  is  more closely tied to the individual  interests tempered by social 
responsibility. 
 
2. Cooperative credit: its initial role and early development  
 
2.1. The Schulze Delitzsch model  
 
The origin of cooperative credit dates to the mid-nineteenth century in Germany. This 
was immediately after the first cooperative of modern form, the Rochdale Pioneers’ 
Equitable Society, had been founded in December 1844 in the English industrial region 
of Lancashire, subsequently serving as a model for mutual enterprise in Europe and 
throughout  the  world.
29  Nevertheless,  whilst  in  England  consumer  cooperation 
generated  an  array  of  other  organizational  forms   which  spread  into  the  field  of 
production and work, from the outset the German movement attributed a central role 
to  credit  and  the  social  entrepreneur  in  proposing  a  new  model  of  growth  and 
development for marginalized areas both urban and, especially, r ural. This was in an 
economic and social context characterized by hardship and poverty, often exacerbated 
by forms of abuse, but also distinguished by expressions of authentic civil and moral 
sturdiness, often supported by firmly-rooted ethical values. 
 
The first mutualist initiatives in the banking sector were undertaken in urban areas by 
Hermann Schulze Delitzsch, the first convinced proponent of credit cooperation, the 
                                                 
29 Birchall 1994; Birchall 1997; Leonardi 1998.  
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inventor  of  people’s  banks
30  and  a  model  of  mutuality  that  placed  the  production 
function at the centre of a complex system.
31 Schulze’s liberal education induced him 
to consider capital as a decisive economic factor, but he did not neglect intelligence 
and moral virtue. Whenever the efforts of the single individual were not enough, free 
association should intervene “to complete and achieve through the strengths of many 
the result that would be awaited in vain from that of just one”.
32 The prime duty of 
these  associations  would  be  to  respect  the  individuality  of  each  of  their  members. 
However, at the basis of the associative experience should be some sort of collective 
will which completed and developed the personal abilities of single individuals. This 
would  require  employment  of  each  member’s  intelligence,  as  well  as  his  or  her 
compliance with moral and economic laws.
33 
 
The foundations of a renewed social system should therefore rest upon associations 
able to take different forms according to the purposes pursued. This was an extremely 
complex construct, with utopian overtones, which saw produc tion cooperation as the 
best way to create a better society where the most severe economic -social injustices 
had  been  eliminated.  Despite  Schulze’s  endeavours,  however,  this  system  never 
materialized, like numerous other projects based on radical forms of mutuality. Once 
Schulze realized that the integral model that he envisaged could not be accomplished 
in the short period, he became a strenuous defender and tireless propagator of urban 
credit associations, which he termed Volksbanken or People’s Banks.
34 Such institutes 
were  novelties  in  Europe:  indeed,  they  were  studied  and  introduced  outside  the 
borders of the German Reich because they proved to be efficient means with which to 




Schulze had seen how technological progress compelled small urban entrepreneurs, 
above all artisans and traders, to acquire capital with which to renew their businesses 
and have sufficient working capital. The credit institutes existing  at the time, which 
usually intermediated large sums requiring collateral, did not meet the needs of such 
operators, who were therefore forced to resort to private agents who, by practising 
usury,  often  increased  their  difficulties.
36  It  was  therefore  necess ary  to  create 
institutes able to issue credit, even for small amounts, to clients who could offer only 




In  some  German  areas,  attempts  were made  to  solve  the  problem,   but  without 
significant  results,  by  founding  credit  institutes  which  based  their  operations  on 
charity bestowed by affluent citizens.
38 The money collected by means of donations 
and interest-free loans, however, inculcated in the recipients the idea that t he grant 
                                                 
30 Born at Delitzsch in Prussian Saxony in 1808, Schulze Delitzsch died in 1883 after seeing people’s banks 
proliferate (Albrecht 1958; Aldenhoff 1984; Schulze-Delitzsch 1987; Mandle, Swoboda 1992: 566-567). 
31 Hermann Schulze’s general model for social reform and improvement of the conditions of the working class, 
and of which the people’s banks would form just one component, was set out in various publications between 
1855 and 1869: Schulze-Delitzsch 1855; 1858; 1863; 1865; 1869. 
32 Tamagnini 1960: 739. 
33 Lorenzoni 1901: 10-11. 
34 After theorizing these institutes in 1855 (Schulze-Delitzsch 1855), Schulze further refined his ideas in 
subsequent editions of the work, fully six of them during his lifetime, followed by three others after his death 
(Schulze-Delitzsch 1926). 
35 Sassen 1914, Gierke 1963; Hoppe 1976; Kluge 1992; Hofinger 2009; Kaltenborn 2006. 
36 This was given particularly clear emphasis in a pamphlet published posthumously: Schulze-Delitzsch 1910. 
37 Tamagnini 1960: 744; Kaltenborn 2006. 
38 Tenfelde 1987.  
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was some sort of welfare benefit. As a consequence, the conviction spread among the 
least wealthy classes that they would never be able to overcome the constrictions of 
their  social  condition  without  recourse  to  charity.
39  According  to  Schulze,  it  was 
important to create credit institutes based instead on the concept of  Selbsthilfe (self-
help)
40, together with that of joint and several liability, and on the capacity to self -
create capital.
41 The banking system could refuse loans to single individuals unable to 
offer the necessary guarantees, but it would have no reason to reject applications by 
an association consisting of all those in need of capital, and able to guarantee the loan 
with the assets of all its associates, as well as with its own capital . It was in fact 
unlikely that the risks which might make some individuals insolvent would affect all 
the others at the same time. The people’s bank was therefore envisaged as a society 




For Schulze, joint and several responsibility and unlimited  liability were essential 
because they enabled associations of this type to procure from the banking system 
the capital necessary for the exercise of credit intermediation towards  its associates, 
given that the first group of members would not have been able to contribute capital 
sufficient for exercise of the enterprise. The guarantee to the  Volksbank’s  creditor 
banks  would  therefore  have  been  provided  by  the  members  themselves,  who 
answered for its actions with all their assets.
43 Awareness that they had risked all their 
possessions with the society that they had voluntarily joined would also induce the 
members to concern themselves with its administration, to attend assemblies, to  feel 
that they belonged to a collective organization that sought to provide its associates 
with the means necessary for them to conduct their activities positively. It would help 
them acquire a sense of personal dignity and regard themselves as equal to o thers, 
thus increasing self-respect, and the conviction that only through their own efforts 
could they escape from economic marginalization.
44 
 
Another essential requirement for the constitution and activity of people’s banks was 
that  they  should  endow  themselves  with  their  own  capital,  which,  together  with 
unlimited joint liability, would provide security for both the society’s creditors and its 
members, since such capital would be the first to be used in the case of losses. It had 
to be constituted through participating shares acquired by individual partners, which 
therefore  constituted  stock,  but  had  different  functions.  They  served  first  of  all  to 
restrict access to the society to people able to help themselves.
45 The possibility of 
paying small monthly sums up to the amount of a shareholding in the society was 
therefore used to select among the potential associates of a people’s bank. It was 
supposed that workers, artisans, or shop owners who were unable to pay the periodic 
dues were either lacking moral qualities, such as diligence or thrift, or were in a state 
of such indigence that they would be unable to repay loans granted by the people’s 
bank. The obligatory acquisition of one or more capital shares also served the purpose 
of  stimulating  members  to  form  their  own  capital,  thus  helping  transform  those 
members  from  the  poorest  social  classes  into  “capitalists”.  This  change  could 
contribute  to  maintenance  of  social  peace  by  opposing  the  systematic  division 
between capital and labour ongoing during maturation of the industrialization process. 
                                                 
39 Schulze-Delitzsch 1926: 68-69: Thorwart, Treue 1990. 
40 Schulze-Delitzsch 1926: 69-70; Zerchen 2001. 
41 Schulze-Delitzsch 1926: 70-72. 
42 Tamagnini 1960: 744 
43 Schulze-Delitzsch 1926: 116. 
44 Tamagnini 1960: 745; Zerchen 2001.  
45 Schulze-Delitzsch 1926: 116.  
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Moreover,  the  people’s  banks  had  to  pay  their  members  dividends  deriving  from 
operating  profits.  Dividends,  in  fact,  would  attract  to  the  bank  people  wanting  to 




As regards the operations of these institutes, Schulze foresaw that loans, usually of 
small  amounts,  should  be  mainly  granted  with  bills  of  exchange.  They  should 
generally be of three months’ duration, though renewable in particular cases, and thus 
cater  to  the  needs  of  shopkeepers  and  artisans.
47  Long-term  loans  would  have 
encouraged negligence, disorder, and slackness among debtors, thereby discouraging 
the sureties
48 without which the bank would have been unable to operate, given that 
it had to ensure repayment of the sums loaned. Therefore, whilst on the one hand the 
obligation to contribute participating shares largely excluded “bad” members, on the 
other, the presence of one or more sureties guaranteed the debtor’s solvency.
49  
 
The  linking  of  this  practice  with  the  payment  of  dividends  to  partners  required 
individual Volksbanken to perform a large number of operations involving relatively 
small sums. Consequently, the geographical area in which a people’s bank operated 
could not be too small in size. Moreover, the interest rate applied to loans and its 
differential with respect to passive interest rates should be such to yield an operating 
profit sufficient to allow the distribution of dividends among members. Consequently, 
if the bank was to operate to the best of its abilities across a broad area, it had to 
endow  itself  with  qualified  personnel,  both  as  administrators  and  employees.  This 
evidently made management costly. The salaries of employees should therefore be 
calculated in function of the bank’s revenues and the gross amounts collected, so as 
to  ensure  constant  commitment  and  the  propensity  to  increase  the  amounts 
intermediated by those responsible for the bank’s management.
50 
 
The  Volksbanken  became  definitively  established  from  1852  onwards.  They  also 
expanded  beyond  German  borders,  an  evident  sign  of  their  efficacy  in  remedying 
situations  of  real  economic  hardship.  They  were  intended  to  constitute  –  as 
emphasised in Italy by Luigi Luzzatti – a “school of civic education” able to teach “the 
value  of  work  and  respectability,  fostering  honest  habits  and  good  husbandry”.
51 
Nevertheless, they were unable to take root in rural areas. The needs of a peasant 
society intent on emerging from marginalization were too different from the ambitions 
of  artisans  and  shop-owners  in  urban  areas.  It  was  consequently  necessary  to  re-
interpret Schulze’s model of cooperative credit so that it matched rural realities and 
convincingly proposed itself to the most vulnerable workers in those areas. 
 
2.2. The Raiffeisen model  
 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, German agriculture had seen, particularly in 
the Prussian countryside, the advent of numerous large market-oriented firms, but 
                                                 
46 Ibid.:165. Because of these rules the Volksbanken were regarded as “bulwarks” against socialism, in that the 
fruits of  labour were deposited in them and, as their Italian promoter, Luigi Luzzatti, argued: “if a socialist revolt 
explodes, he [the worker-member of a people’s bank] will place himself under the flag of the order, and if his 
heart or most generous instincts do not persuade him to withstand those wretched temptations, selfishness will 
make him a defender of society” (Luzzatti 1997: 102). 
47 Kaltenborn 2006; Hofinger 2009. 
48 Schulze-Delitzsch 1926: 237-243. 
49 Ibid.: 244-246. 
50 Ibid.: 303-305. 
51 Luzzatti 1997.  
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also  the  progressive  elimination  of  small  farmers.  The  principal  cause  was  an 
insufficiency  of  capital,  both  fixed  and  working,  which  precluded  modernization  of 
either  the  agrarian  structure  or  production  processes.  As  the  market  developed, 
producing for self-consumption was no longer enough, not even on disadvantageous 
economic  conditions.
52  It was necessary to specialize and to introduce innovative 
methods in order to have products placeable on the commercial circuit. This would be 
made possible only by furnishing the necessary capital to small farmers, at reasonable 
rates, and without requiring particular and burdensome collateral. Thus usury could be 
combated.
53 The challenge of identifying in small German rural communities the latent 
resources able to engender change was taken up  by Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen,
54 
who is rightly considered the father of the particular form of rural cooperation which, 
by valorizing the social function of credit promoted in mutual terms, would grow to 
such proportions in all the countries of the West . Raiffeisen realized that small farm 
businesses could not be freed from the vicious circle in which they were trapped by 
relying on help from outside, but only on the energies present within the system, and 
by applying the principle of Selbsthilfe.
55 However, the needs, the economic structure, 
the nature of rural  people, and above all, the time necessary for  investment to 





57  were  formed  gradually  and  with  the  occurrence  of  direct 
experiences.
58  While  his  first  initiatives  were  still  permeated  with  welfarism,  he 
subsequently became convinced that interventions from the outside could at most 
provide an initial stimulus, in that opportunities of economic growth should arise from 
the self-propulsive capacities of rural communities.
59 In 1864 Raiffeisen transformed 
an  association  founded  a  few  years  previously  at  Heddesdorf,  in  Rhineland 
Westerwald, from a benevolent society into a cooperative bank. This was  the first 
Darlehenskassenvereine (Social credit bank),
60 and it was patterned to a large extent 
on Schulze’s model. The first statute, in fact, stipulated substantial capital shares, the 
accumulation  of  working  capital,  the  allocation  of  dividends,  and  a  territorial  area 
comprising several villages.
61 However, it differed from Schulze’s model by obliging  
gratuitous  administration  and  the  formation  of  indivisible  capital.
62  The subsequent 
                                                 
52 Of considerable detail, and extendable from Austria to other Central-European areas, is the discussion by 
Bruckmüller 1977. See also Conze 1958.  
53 Hasselmann 1984; Hönigsheim 1953; Klein 1997. 
54 Born in 1818 at Hamm in Rhineland Prussia, Raiffeisen died at Neuwied in 1888 after devoting his life to 
spreading his cooperative model (Sinning 1968; Klein 1997). 
55 Froschauer, Sandgruber, Schneider 1994. 
56 Leonardi 2000. 
57 Set out for the first time in an 1866 publication, which subsequently went into several editions, entitled “The 
credit banks as a means to fight the misery of the rural population as well as the urban artisans and workers”: 
Raiffeisen 1866. 
58 In 1847 at Weyerbusch in the Rhine Westerwald, where he was mayor, Raiffeisen founded a sort of consumer 
cooperative (Maxeiner 1988; Klein 1997). Two years later, at Flammersfeld, he tried a new approach to the 
problem of rural poverty by creating an association for the aid of poor farmers. This association was constituted 
as a limited liability company and its main purpose was to eliminate usurious trading in livestock (Lorenzoni 
1901, vol.II: 130 -154). In 1852, at Heddersdorf, Raiffeisen founded a benevolent society whose priority was to 
satisfy the money needs of its members (Klein 1999). 
59 Raiffeisen 1866: 7-10. 
60 Raiffeisen 1866; Krebs 1943; Klein 1997; Klein 1999. His organizational commitment not only to cooperative 
credit but to agricultural cooperation as a whole was essential referent for the cooperative movement, and not 
just in Germany (Krebs 1943; Sinnig 1968; Faust 1977; Hasselmann 1984; Froschauer, Sandgruber, Schneider 
1994; Klein 1997; Klein 1999; Maxeiner 1988).   
61 Leonardi 2000; Libbi 1984. 
62 Koch 2000.  
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The Darlehenskassenvereine (known in Italy as Casse Rurali or rural savings banks) 
were born to a large extent separately from the Volksbank, which had chronologically 
preceded  them  by  some  years,  although  they  were  evidently  influenced  by  the 
mutualist experiments developed by Schulze-Delitzsch, and also by their shortcomings 
when  introduced  into  rural  areas.
64  They were aimed at the economic, social and 
moral regeneration of rural society in a climate of strong e vangelical solidarity.
65 For 
Raiffeisen, in fact, besides economic motivations, also ethical ones were essential. 
Hence, Social credit banks were to be the means to constitute a new “social order”
66 
based  on  Christian  love.
67  However,  ethical  motivations  did  not  signify  that  the 
Darlehenskassenvereine were to be charitable institutions: their members could only 
be persons of proven moral worth who had also demonstrated that they could meet 
their commitments to the cooperative by increasing thrift and diligence in their work. 
These were concepts cherished by the reformed Christian churches and had already 
been expressed half a century before by the Central-European proponents of the first 
savings  banks.
68  The  task  of  assuming  an  active  and  constructive  role  in  cr edit 
cooperatives fell to well-off members of the community, who undertook it for free in 
that they were induced by religious motivations. For Schulze, the affluent joined the 




Unlike in the case of the people’s banks, the essential rule in the operational practice 
of the Social credit banks was that they must restrict the geographical area in which 
they operated as much as possible; that  is, to the parish and  its inhabitants. This 
would allow members to have perfect knowledge of the economic and moral situations 
of  co-members,  so  that  when  a  member  requested  a  loan,  they  would  be  able  to 
appraise his solvency without risking losses. However, not only was ability to repay 
the loan to be assessed, but also how the capital advanced would be used, with the 
exclusion  of  applications  that  would  not  have  led  to  a  productive  investment.  No 
credit,  even  if  sufficiently  guaranteed,  would  be  granted to applicants who  did  not 
possess solid moral qualities.
70 A small territorial area and therefore a limited range of 
activity, moreover, would also make it possible to adapt to the mentality of country 
residents  mistrustful  of  novelty,  as  well  as  to  operate  gratuitously,  with  notable 
savings for the cooperative.
71 
 
Since the task of a cooperative association was to obtain credit on the best terms 
possible, and to furnish it to members at the lowest cost, admission was allowed to all 
the inhabitants of the district in which the Social credit bank operated, without regard 
to  their  economic  situation,  unless  their  behaviour  had  shown  that  they  were 
                                                 
63 Maxeiner 1988: 122-124. 
64 As emphasised at the beginning of the twentieth century by Giovanni Lorenzoni (Lorenzoni 1901, vol. I: 11 -
12) and reiterated by contemporary scholars (Froschauer, Sandgruber, Schneider 1994). 
65 Sinnig 1968; Engelhardt 1977; Faust 1977; Hasselmann 1984; Klein 1999. 
66 Raiffeisen 1866: 12-26. 
67 Maxeiner 1988: 124-126. 
68 Wysocki  1994; Leonardi 2001: 3-28. 
69 Despite its different structure, the Heddesdorfer Darlehenskasse initially belonged to the organization of 
Volksbanken created by Schulze, although it stressed the need for clear organizational distinctions so as to meet 
the needs of rural residents better; Libbi 1984: 71. 
70 Raiffeisen 1922: 34-42. 
71 Müller 1901: 198-201.  
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unworthy.
72  Unlike  the  people’s  banks,  the  Social  credit  banks  did  not  require  the 
payment  of  capital  shares,  these  being  deemed  unnecessary  either  to  increase 
guarantees for creditors or to foster moral behaviour by members. Selection among 
applicants for membership of the Social credit bank – who would have to guarantee 
with all their assets (properties, livestock, equipment) the initiatives undertaken by 
the institute – was based less on entrance fees than on mutual knowledge and respect 
among members.
73 Moreover, Raiffeisen was convinced that their free administration 
was necessary in order to guarantee security for the members of a credit union, to 
encourage solidarity, and to curb spending. Because the administrators were not 
remunerated and were subject to the social responsibility constraint, they would be 
meticulous and prudent in assessing  guarantees and in granting loans, undertaking 
only operations with nil or minimal risks.
74 
 
This procedure would also make  it possible to save on management costs, thus 
reducing the interest rates on loans, granted for both the brief and long term on the 
basis  of  synchronization  of  the  loan’s  expiry  with  its  use.  The  forms  of  payment, 
therefore,  had  to  correspond  to  those  of  the  yield  on  the  investment.  This  was 
because,  unlike  urban  producers,  small  farmers  realized  their  profits  once  a  year, 
when crops were harvested or livestock was sold. Because the capital borrowed could 
not  be  easily  repaid,  either  in  the  short  term  or  in  a  lump  sum,  long  periods  of 
repayment with the possibility of instalment amortization were therefore necessary.
75 
This aspect was criticised by Schulze-Delitzsch and by the supporters of the  people’s 
banks on the grounds that it might provoke financial difficulties, given the need of 
these banks endowed with relatively scant deposits and savings to rely on large credit 
intermediaries and the constraints imposed by them.
76 
 
However, every loan granted by the cooperative had to be guaranteed, given that the 
Darlehenskassenvereine had no intention of dispensing charity.
77 The most frequently 
used form of guarantee was the surety, while bills of exchange were not accepted, 
being  deemed  inappropriate  and  unadvisable  because  they  did  not  match  the 
mentality and the needs of the rural population. Moreover, it might have recalled, 
albeit improperly, the so-called “slip-noose” method used by usurers.
78 The borrowing 
rate  of  interest  had  to  be  fixed  by  the  general  assembly,  which  also  decided  the 
maximum  amount  of  loans  issuable.  Money  would  nevertheless  not  be  granted  at 
rates lower than the market one, because as an undervalued commodity it would not 
have  been  held  in  due  consideration.  Interest  receivable,  however,  would  not  be 
collected in advance, as at the people’s banks, but in deferred form throughout the 
duration of the loan.
79 
 
Operating profits were to be set aside in an indivisible reserve fund which served as 
guarantee for capital borrowings. But w hen it reached an amount that made the 
                                                 
72 Raiffeisen 1922: 44-48; Lorenzoni 1901, vol.I: 16-17. 
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cooperative financially solid, it could also be used for works of public utility and for 
social and cultural improvement. It therefore performed a declared solidarist function 
which extended beyond mutualism.
80 If the cooperative was dissolved, the fund was 
not  to  be  separated  among  members,  as  in  the  case  of  the  people’s  banks,  but 
instead  made  available  to  societies  of  the  same  type.
81  Operating profit was not 
divided among the members in the form of dividends, also be cause, given its often 
negligible amount, it would not have contributed to improving their circumstances. 
Conversely, the constitution of cooperative equity in a rural society constantly subject 
to property variations would have enabled the accumulation of common assets to the 
advantage of the district in which the bank operated, and which would have served for 
its recovery if hit by an unforeseen crisis. The non -distribution of profits, besides 
giving greater financial stability to the society, also had th e educational function of 
reviving and  consolidating the spirit of solidarity.
82 
 
Whilst the primary function of the banks created by Raiffeisen was to enable access to 
credit to people who would otherwise have been excluded from it, one should not 
forgot  the  encouragement  that  they  gave  to  savings  formation  in  rural  society. 
Besides guaranteeing loans on advantageous conditions, they allowed the deposit of 
savings in a secure and remunerative manner. Savers knew who administered their 
savings and could evaluate their use, something which they could not have done with 




The  Darlehenskassenvereine  were characterized,  like  all  cooperative  societies, by  a 
democratic  administration  whose  main  organ  of  governance  was  the  general 
assembly,  in  which  sat  side  by  side,  with  the  same  rights  and  duties,  affluent 
members  and  those  less  endowed  with  resources.  Election  of  the  executive  and 
control bodies followed the “one man, one vote” principle. The assembly could decide 
on  any  problem  connected  with  management  of  the  enterprise,  even  though  its 
commercial nature – with the consequent need to take decisions rapidly  – induced 
delegation  of  certain  powers  to  the  other  administrative  organs.  However,  the 
assembly always retained competence to fix the amount of capital to lend, determine 
interest rates and commissions, the maximum credit limit that could be granted to a 
member,  the  terms  for  repayment  of  loans,  and  the  treasurer’s  remuneration.
84 
Attendance at meetings was considered an obligation,
85 so as to prevent entry into 
the cooperative of members who interested themselves in its management only when 
they needed a loan. The assembly, moreover, was also an important oc casion for 
members to obtain information and learn cooperative culture.
86 
 
The other governance bodies of the cooperative were the management board and the 
supervisory board. The former was the executive organ for the assembly’s decisions. 
It therefore examined loan applications, evaluating not only the guarantees provided, 
but  also  the  necessity  and  expedience  of  the  projected  loan.  The  task  of  the 
supervisory  board  was  to  conduct  a  three-monthly  review  of  the  cooperative’s 
management and accounts.
87 
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The success of Raiffeisen’s cooperative at Heddesdorf rapidly attracted attention in the 
surrounding rural areas, and similar initiatives were launched in numerous German 
towns.
88  As  such  cooperative  societies  spread,  it  became  opportune  –  and  soon 
necessary – to aggregate them for the purposes of coordination and promotion.
89 The 
objective was not only that of having them assume a common and uniform regulatory 
regime, which would help them consolidate and expand; it was also to “govern” the 
assets and requirements of the individual Social credit banks.
90 The creation of the 
regional  federations  served  the  former  purpose;  the  introduction  of  central 
cooperative banks served the latter. 
 
The task of the federations was to foster the growth of cooperative societies by 
assisting them and providing them with every kind of consultancy and representation 
towards  third  parties.  They  therefore  acted  as  associations  of  protection, 
representation and promotion. They also assumed the task – essential for the survival 
of individual cooperatives and for guarantees towards third parties – of periodically 
auditing their member-societies, reporting possible accounting anomalies, errors, or 
management practices in contradiction with cooperative principles. This external and 
impartial control guaranteed for both third parties and members the regularity and 
legality  of  the  cooperative  enterprise’s  management,  as  well  as  the  veracity  of  its 
financial  statements.
91  The  central  cooperative  banks  instead  acted  as  clearing 
houses,  which  guarant eed  secure  investments  for  the  credit  cooperatives  with 
surpluses of liquidity with respect to local demand and extended credit to those in 
financial deficit.
92  To this end, and in keeping with self -help principles, the credit 
cooperatives  established  their   first  networks  in  the  form  of  regional  cooperative 
banks, which also operated for exclusively mutualist ends and therefore excluded 
profit-seeking. They were based, in fact, on the founding principles of the individual 
cooperative banks and therefore on t he unlimited liability of their members, which 
could only be Social credit banks operating in the region.
93 Second-level organizations 
were  also  created  for  a  series  of  other  collateral  activities  undertaken  by  the  




2.3. The two models compared and the synthesis by Haas  
 
The models developed by Raiffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch both envisaged the credit 
cooperative as the pivot of a complex system of associations operating in the area of 
                                                 
88 Kluge 1992; Klein 1997. 
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consumption as well as that of  production.
95 This view was indubitably a novelty, in 
that the cooperative model devised at Rochdale and already widespread in Europe 
posited consumer cooperation as the point of departure for the development of other 
forms  of  cooperation.
96  However,  there  was  no  homogeneity  in  the  German 
cooperative approach and, although Raiffeisen started from theoretical considerations 




Both the promoters of cooperative credit attributed a strategic role to the institutions 
which they had brought into being. The basic difference sprang from different ideal 
aspirations and from the overall purpose of the cooperative.
98  In the Raiffeisenian 
conception, unlimited liability, the accumulation of an indivisible fund, the granting of 
credit to meritorious applicants, the unpaid nature of administrative offices, and in 
general the tendency not to seek profit for its own sake but for the benefit of all  
members  alike,  were  concepts  consequent  upon  convinced  commitment  to  the 
Christian message of brotherly love.
99 Cooperatives based on Schulze’s model applied 
their  founding  principles
100  with  a  view  to  immediate  economic  utility  and  the 
psychological and moral features of those to whom they were addressed. Whilst in the 
former case rules were applied as a matter of principle, in the latter the same rules 
were applied pragmatically, and they could be altered as circumstances changed, thus 
giving flexibility to the organization. On the one hand, cooperation was considered to 
be a religious “derivation” representing a branch of the social activity of a Christian 
community,  whether  evangelical  or  Catholic;
101  on the other, it was considered an 
essentially economic movement where there was a place for all regardless of their 
religious beliefs. As emphasised from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, the 
force of Schulze-Delitzsch’s message lay in its highly pragmatic capacity to meet the 
needs of the lower middle class. By addressing artisans and shopkeepers,  Schulze – 
as the economist Gustav von Schmoller pointed out in 1890 – “had no need to appeal 
to vague philosophical and social systems, but to the good commercial sense and the 
narrow  mentality  of  the  petit  bourgeoisie”.
102  For  Raiffeisen,  by  contrast,  the 
cooperative  creed  drove  a  universalist  endeavour  to  render  social  co-living  more 
harmonious. 
 
Raiffeisen’s vision of cooperative enterprise provoked fierce criticism from the outset, 
not only from Schulze-Delitzsch,
103 but also from observers attentive to the immediate 
economic effect of cooperative action. It was pointed out in particular that the much 
proclaimed love for one’s neighbour was often more theorized that practised, being 
present only in statutory principles. The proponents of the “economicist” approach to 
cooperation criticised the Raiffeisen model on the grounds that its religious-mystical 
apparatus  was  only  a  propaganda  device,  so  that  disinterested  love  for  one’s 
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neighbour was embraced as long as it cost nothing.
104 
 
This  dispute  between  two  personalities  starting  from  different  social  and  cultural 
experiences and origins was now joined by Wilhelm Haas, who was distinguished more 
as a tireless organizer than a theoretician.
105  In 1883, Haas founded th e Union of 
Agricultural Cooperatives, doing so with the approval of Schulze -Delitzsch, who was 
now convinced that it was impossible to unite urban and agricultural cooperation 
within a single federation. The underlying principle was, as Raiffeisen had argued, that 
rural  society  required  an  autonomous  and  independent  cooperative  union. 
Nevertheless, the cooperatives founded on the new pattern were distinct from those 
based on the Raiffeisenian model because they did not accept, and indeed regarded as 
superfluous, any mystical and religious vocation. One of the mainstays of Raiffeisen’s 
conception  was  thus  gainsaid  by  the  conviction  that  that  pure  cooperation  was 
possible  by  adapting  Schulze’s  commercial  ideas  to  the  countryside,  without 
sentimentality  or  mysticism.  According  to  Haas,  the  cooperative  enterprise  should 
pursue only those goals, such as economic ones, able to unite; while those that might 
divide,  such  as  religious  inspiration,  were  to  be  postponed,  especially  in  a  multi-
confessional country like Germany.
106 
 
 Although at first glance the structure given by Haas to the German cooperative 
movement might seem to have rejected the Raiffeisenian doctrine, in fact it faithfully 
interpreted one of its core notions: the neutrality of the cooperative instrument, even 
if it was of Christian inspiration. Once space had been created, also in organizational 
terms, for a neutral notion of cooperation, after Raiffeisen’s death in 1888 Haas was 
able  to  organize  German  agricultural  cooperation  on  broader  and  more  composite 
bases  by  merging  all  other  forms  of  agricultural  cooperation  into  credit 
cooperatives.
107 Moreover, farmers not only gained greater self-confidence,
108 but they 
performed  an  important  function  of  diffusing  new  agronomic  techniques,  thus 




This model – despite the criticisms of the socialists, who viewed it as an attempt at 
the “embourgeoisement” of the working class and therefore only condoned production 
and  consumption  cooperatives,  but  not  cooperative  banks  –  was  soon  studied  and 
adapted in several regions of Europe. At the end of the 1870s, it was possible to verify 
the extent to which the idea first formulated by Schulze, then adapted to the rural 
context  by  Raiffeisen,  and  finally  revisited  by  Haas,  had  proved  fertile.  Amid  the 
“great  deflation”  and  the  spread  throughout  Europe  of  the  crisis  provoked  by  the 
collapse  of  agricultural  prices,  the  Raiffeisenkassen  traversed  Germany’s  borders. 
Their operational capacity was successfully implemented in the rural areas of Belgium, 
France, the Habsburg Monarchy, and various parts of Italy. The model also crossed 
the  Atlantic,
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